Calculus of Consent via MARL: Legitimating the Collaborative Governance Supplying Public Goods (preprint)

Public policies that supply public goods, especially those involve collaboration by limiting individual liberty, always give rise to controversies over governance legitimacy. Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) methods are appropriate for supporting the legitimacy of the public policies that supply public goods at the cost of individual interests. Among these policies, the inter-regional collaborative pandemic control is a prominent example, which has become much more important for an increasingly inter-connected world facing a global pandemic like COVID-19. Different patterns of collaborative strategies have been observed among different systems of regions, yet it lacks an analytical process to reason for the legitimacy of those strategies. In this paper, we use the inter-regional collaboration for pandemic control as an example to demonstrate the necessity of MARL in reasoning, and thereby legitimizing policies enforcing such inter-regional collaboration. Experimental results in an exemplary environment show that our MARL approach is able to demonstrate the effectiveness and necessity of restrictions on individual liberty for collaborative supply of public goods. Different optimal policies are learned by our MARL agents under different collaboration levels, which change in an interpretable pattern of collaboration that helps to balance the losses suffered by regions of different types, and consequently promotes the overall welfare. Meanwhile, policies learned with higher collaboration levels yield higher global rewards, which illustrates the benefit of, and thus provides a novel justification for the legitimacy of, promoting inter-regional collaboration. Therefore, our method shows the capability of MARL in computationally modeling and supporting the theory of calculus of consent, developed by Nobel Prize winner J. M. Buchanan.

Reinforced Contact Tracing and Epidemic Intervention (preprint)

The recent outbreak of COVID-19 poses a serious threat to people's lives. Epidemic control strategies have also caused damage to the economy by cutting off humans' daily commute. In this paper, we develop an Individual-based Reinforcement Learning Epidemic Control Agent (IDRLECA) to search for smart epidemic control strategies that can simultaneously minimize infections and the cost of mobility intervention. IDRLECA first hires an infection probability model to calculate the current infection probability of each individual. Then, the infection probabilities together with individuals' health status and movement information are fed to a novel GNN to estimate the spread of the virus through human contacts. The estimated risks are used to further support an RL agent to select individual-level epidemic-control actions. The training of IDRLECA is guided by a specially designed reward function considering both the cost of mobility intervention and the effectiveness of epidemic control. Moreover, we design a constraint for control-action selection that eases its difficulty and further improve exploring efficiency. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that IDRLECA can suppress infections at a very low level and retain more than 95% of human mobility.